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MORTGAGE TAKINGS AND  
MUNICIPAL FINANCE: A SOLUTION FOR 
PRESERVING HOME OWNERSHIP 
Necessity alone is not the test by which the limits of state authority in this 
direction are to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look beyond the 
expenditures which are absolutely needful to continue the existence of 
organized government, and embrace others which may tend to make that 
government subserve the general well-being of society, and advance the 
present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Several years into the largest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression, housing prices and the value of home equity have stabilized.2 
While the free fall may have been suspended, the stagnant growth of a 
matured American economy3 and lackluster income growth4 have left many 
homeowners financially overwhelmed by the mortgages they took on when 
credit was cheap and owning a home appeared to be a sound, if not wildly 
profitable, investment. That the housing market is still hemorrhaging 
foreclosures5 suggests that the market correction process is nowhere near an 
end.6 It may take years to fully recover.7 
                                                                                                                 
 1. People ex rel. Detroit & H.R. Co. v. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 475 (1870) (per Chief 
Justice Thomas M. Cooley). 
 2. Press Release, Fiserv, Inc., Fiserve Case-Shiller Home Price Insights: After Six Years of 
Decline, U.S. Home Prices Find Their Footing (Aug. 6, 2012), available at 
http://newsroom.fiserv.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=698315; Press Release, Fiserv, Inc., 
Fiserv Case-Shiller Home Price Insights: U.S. Housing Markets Stabilizing, Affordability 
Reaches 40-Year High (May 8, 2012), available at http://investors.fiserv.com/releasedetail.cfm 
?ReleaseID=671290. 
 3. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET 
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 17 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/spec.pdf (generously predicting three percent GDP growth for FY 
2013). 
 4. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., June 2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf (From 2007 to 2010, “real 
(inflation-adjusted) family income before taxes fell 7.7 percent; median income had also fallen 
slightly in the preceding three-year period.”). 
 5. Monthly foreclosures are decreasing in number, but the total number of foreclosures is still 
quite high. Associated Press, Data Show US Foreclosure Filings Fell to 5-Year Low in 
September; Homes on Track down 12 Pct., FOX NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com 
/us/2012/10/11/data-show-us-foreclosure-filings-fell-to-5-year-low-in-september-homes-on-track/ 
(“There were 180,427 foreclosure filings report for September [2012], the fewest since July 2007 
in the midst of the housing market bust.”). 
 6. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: 
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 8 (2012) [hereinafter BD. OF GOVERNORS, 
U.S. HOUSING MARKET], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports 
/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf (estimating that in 2011 there were approximately 2 
million vacant homes for sale, with one-quarter of that inventory possibly coming from 
foreclosures—“held by banks, guarantors, and services after the completion of foreclosure 
proceedings”). 
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If the raw foreclosure data were not bad enough, the mortgages that 
have not yet defaulted or been foreclosed upon present dismal prospects for 
the macroeconomy and a possible “housing recovery.” Many homeowners 
are behind on their mortgages8 or nearing default.9 Even homeowners who 
are current on their mortgages10 often have little hope or economic 
incentive11 to pay down the balance of their mortgage. This disincentive is 
the result of negative equity, which means the amount still owed on the 
mortgage exceeds the value of the underlying home.12 Throughout the 
country, homeowners who are trying to stay in their homes, and trying to 
protect what might be their most valuable asset and investment, face the 
prospect13 of continuing to make huge mortgage payments relative to their 
homes’ actual value.14 
The longer homeowners must contribute large portions of their income 
just to keep their existing homes, the worse their situation will become; and 
the longer the cumulative housing-foreclosure strain will weigh on the 
larger economy, which in turn weighs on homeowners who have no home 
                                                                                                                 
 7. The home mortgage market is still smaller than it was six years ago, down to $10.0 trillion 
from $10.4 trillion in 2006. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS 
ACCOUNTS FOR THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS: SECOND QUARTER 2012, at 
104 tbl. L.217 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20120920/z1.pdf. 
 8. BD. OF GOVERNORS, U.S. HOUSING MARKET, supra note 6, at 21 n.39 (“About 660,000 
mortgages are 30 days past due, 310,000 are 60 days past due, 1 million are 90 days or more past 
due . . . .”). 
 9. The Federal Reserve estimates that 12 million mortgages are underwater, “representing 
roughly $425 billion in negative equity.” Id. at 21. For bleaker numbers, see John Gittelsohn, U.S. 
Homeowners with Negative Equity Drop as Prices Rise, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2012, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-23/u-s-homeowners-with-negative-equity-drop-as-
prices-rise.html (“About 15.3 million homeowners, or almost 31 percent of those with a mortgage, 
had negative equity as of June 30 [2012] . . . .”). 
 10. BD. OF GOVERNORS, U.S. HOUSING MARKET, supra note 6, at 21 (estimating 8.6 million 
negative equity mortgages are current on their payments).  
 11. See Robert C. Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and 
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local 
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 174–75 (2012) [hereinafter Hockett, It Takes 
a Village]. 
 12. A negative equity mortgage is one where the homeowner owes more money on the 
mortgage than their home is actually worth. This is also referred to as having an “underwater” 
mortgage. Christopher L. Foote et al., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence 1, 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Discussion Paper No. 08-3, 2008), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2008/ppdp0803.pdf. These two terms of art are used 
interchangeably throughout the Note. 
 13. For examples, see Peter S. Goodman, Eminent Domain as Underwater Mortgages Fix: 
Why Some Cities Are Considering Unorthodox Measure, HUFFINGTON POST (October 1, 2012, 
11:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1917391 
.html. 
 14. The mortgage industry and economists generally refer to the “loan-to-value” ratio as a 
simple and crude measure to analyze the default risk of a mortgage. Fannie Mae Multifamily 
Securities Locator Service Glossary, FANNIE MAE, 6, http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file 
/mbs/pdf/Disclosure_Glossary.pdf (last updated Aug. 2013). 
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equity.15 Moreover, the incentive structure for the various constituents 
affected by the mortgage and housing market is one that makes it unlikely 
that any one party—the homeowner, the mortgagee, or the servicer—will 
take any action that preserves the economic fundamentals beyond those that 
directly impact its individual interests.16 Homeowners want to keep their 
homes and maintain home-equity value; mortgagees (investors)17 want to 
get the most money out of their mortgage investment;18 and servicers want 
to generate fees.19 One scholar has articulated these divergent interests, and 
the “self-worsening” cycle that they create, as part of a larger collective 
action problem that plagues the housing market and stifles economic 
recovery.20 
An appropriate solution to the collective action problem must tolerate 
millions of homeowners21 with diverse financial circumstances and varying 
abilities to pay their mortgages as they come due, matched against a smaller 
and more uniform demographic of mortgage investors, who having cast 
their bread on the water are tasked with deciding how best to get it back.22 
Consequently, the manifold nature of the housing crisis and impending 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Homeowners may lose their homes regardless of their thrift or might pay for them many 
times over, given the excessive balances of the underlying mortgages. See Hockett, It Takes a 
Village, supra note 11, at 133–36. 
 16.  See generally Robert C. Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of 
Procyclicality in Financial Markets, Monetary Systems, Macroeconomies and Formally Similar 
Contexts, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Hockett, Recursive Collective 
Action Problems] (addressing these “recursive collective action problems” and proposing coherent 
collective agency for their solution). 
 17. For a discussion of the two “loss-mitigation strategies,” loan modification and forbearance, 
see Foote et al., supra note 12, at 4, 19–26.  
 18. Preserving the value of an individual mortgage does not necessarily imply that an investor 
wants to maintain or improve the actual possibility that they will be paid the amount due under the 
mortgage’s terms. Rather, it may mean preserving the value merely in accounting terms, by 
preventing foreclosures or refusing to write-down the mortgage, especially if the investor is an 
entity composed of shareholders. See generally id. at 4 n.4. Of course, there is a paradox here: 
mortgage investors might improve their actual expected return on investment by modifying the 
loan in favor of the homeowner to greatly reduce the likelihood of foreclosure, but this entails 
writing-down and permanently impairing the very investment they are trying to preserve. See id. 
at 19. 
 19. For a succinct explanation of the respective interests in the microeconomics mortgage 
crisis, see Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 140–41. 
 20. Id. at 123; see also Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 16 
(describing large “debt overhang” requires collective action); Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: 
An Essay in Constructive Retrieval, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2012) (discussing 
Keynesian economic policy in dealing with collective action problems). 
 21. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 149 (“The challenge, again, is effectively an 
enormous coordination problem faced by literally hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of 
dispersed interested parties. Each of these parties acting individually has good reason to wait for 
the others to act, and so the group as a whole fails to act.”).   
 22. For an incredibly pragmatic solution that could easily be implemented at the federal level, 
see Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008) (arguing that asset-backed securities, in many 
instances, have themselves become “too big to fail” and should be amenable to the federal 
Bankruptcy Code). 
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wave of foreclosures have forced economists and legal scholars alike to 
propose solutions that consider the many conflicts and issues that a single 
ramshackle federal program could not encompass. Not that the federal 
government hasn’t tried; it has.23 However, going forward, plausible 
solutions to the foreclosure crisis at the federal level require both political-
will and consensus—two qualities the federal government does not now 
possess.24 
One such proposal, advocated by Professor Robert Hockett,25 has 
drawn attention in both public and private circles.26 Professor Hockett 
recommends that municipal governments27 use the power of eminent 
domain to seize “underwater” mortgages from mortgagees (presumably 
lenders or investors), after which the municipality will negotiate new 
mortgage terms with the homeowner-mortgagor dependent upon terms and 
financing that the homeowner can receive through private refinancing.28 
Unlike the existing mortgages, the refinanced mortgage obligations are 
intended to reflect the current market value of the underlying properties and 
similarly to reduce the principal amount owed by homeowners.29 
Essentially, the hope is that condemning the mortgage and then refinancing 
it at market terms will displace the homeowner’s negative equity.30 
However, in order to achieve that outcome in an economical manner, 
municipalities must ensure that the amount paid to condemn the mortgage 
note is substantially below the face value of the mortgage obligation.31 The 
benefits of the proposal may be realized only if this condition can be 
consistently (and legally) satisfied.32 In sum, the homeowner’s deliverance 
                                                                                                                 
 23. For a discussion of various federal programs, see Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 
11, at 143–49 (arguing that the federal government’s plans in the form of the Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), along with 
suggestions by the federal government to expand the mandates of either the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) or Federal Reserve System to preserve homeownership, have been 
ineffectual). 
 24. Of course, any major legislative action requiring agreement poses a different kind of 
collective action problem. Cf. Michael O’Brien, Poll: If Government Careens off Fiscal Cliff, 
GOP to Shoulder Blame, NBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com 
/_news/2012/11/13/15141771-poll-if-government-careens-off-fiscal-cliff-gop-to-shoulder-blame. 
 25. Robert C. Hockett is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School.  
 26. Nick Timiraos, Investor Group Calls Richmond, Calif., Eminent Domain Plan 
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles 
/SB10001424127887324522504578654690187664354. 
 27. “We refer to the states and their municipalities—townships, cities, counties, and kindred 
units of local government.” Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 150.  
 28. Id. at 150–52.   
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 169. 
 31. Id. at 137–38 (arguing for large-scale principal reductions). 
 32. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (Takings Clause); see Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 
(1897). 
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requires that the mortgagee absorb the negative equity as a loss in the 
condemnation proceeding.33 
Apart from Professor Hockett, the private company Mortgage 
Resolution Partners (MRP)34 is offering for a flat, per-loan fee to act as an 
intermediary that will consult municipalities on which mortgages are 
appropriate to condemn.35 MRP has outlined its prospective role as an 
advisor to municipalities that are considering condemning mortgages.36 The 
company foresees “Five Stages of Relief” whereby (1) MRP screens 
existing mortgages in a municipality so that the municipality can inform 
homeowners if they qualify; (2) then private investors (mortgage lenders) 
fund an escrow account while the municipality files a condemnation suit; 
(3) assuming the lawsuit is successful, the loan is transferred to a trustee (4) 
to be restructured and (5) (re)securitized as a mortgage-backed security.37 
Currently, Richmond, California, is considering implementing 
Professor Hockett’s general proposal.38 Strangely enough, one of the 
implicit selling points of Professor Hockett’s proposal is that it retains some 
of the grace of a free-market,39 or private-sector, solution—with the role of 
local government limited to condemning the mortgage, while private 
mortgage lenders and homeowners take on the risk of newly issued 
mortgages.40 Unsurprisingly, not everyone sees mortgage condemnation as 
an appropriate use of government power, even if it is legally sound.41 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 156 (describing municipalities as 
possible conduits to negotiate write downs between lenders and borrowers).  
 34. Mortgage Resolution Partners LLC (MRP) is based in San Francisco, California, and 
markets itself as a “Community Advisory firm.” See MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS, 
http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 35. MRP made a formal presentation entitled “Homeownership Protection Program.” See 
Mortgage Resolution Partners, Homeownership Protection Program: A Solution to a Critical 
Problem, AM. SECURITIZATION F., 9, http://www.americansecuritization.com/UPLOADEDFILES 
/MRP_POWERPOINT_BW.PDF (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 11.  
 38. Niraj Chokshi, Things Are Bad for the 15 Communities That Explored a Desperate 
Housing Bailout, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/govbeat/wp/2013/10/24/things-are-bad-for-the-15-communities-that-explored-a-desperate-
housing-bailout/. 
 39. Robert Hockett, Testimony at the Hon Maxine Waters’ Financial Services Panel: The 
Housing Crisis and Policy Solutions (Sept. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/upload/Testimony-of-Robert-Hockett-11-September-
2012-Third-Round.pdf (“Private entities will provide all funding and take all risk to acquire and 
refinance the mortgage loans.”).  
 40. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 152 (emphasis added) (“Municipalities or 
authorities acting on the [eminent domain] Plan will pay for the mortgage-associated loans and 
liens of which they take legal possession with funds supplied by the aforementioned private sector 
investors. Among these investing institutions—which, notably, may include current loan and lien 
holders themselves, indirectly through MBS—will be one or more of the following: public and 
private pension funds, insurances companies, mutual funds and other investment firms.”); see also 
David Reiss, Eminently Reasonable, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 24, 2012, at 35, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id 
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The balance of this Note will first demonstrate the contingencies of a 
plan where the local government serves as an intermediary, condemning a 
mortgage from one recalcitrant mortgagee so that another lender may 
refinance or underwrite a new mortgage that reflects the current market 
value of the underlying home. Second, I propose a novel and 
comprehensive plan that utilizes the unique role that municipalities can play 
in the mortgage takings context. My proposal, too, foresees local 
governments condemning underwater mortgages. But instead of leaving 
them to be refinanced by private mortgage lenders, who will operate at 
arm’s length, I argue that it might be more beneficial for local governments 
to simply hold onto such mortgages for their term of years, using them as 
collateral to secure municipal bonds, which will provide the primary source 
of financing for the mortgage takings. 
Throughout the exposition of my proposed publicly financed mortgage 
takings, I outline the legal issues that both my and Professor Hockett’s plan 
face. It is better left to economists to address the possible impact that 
publicly financed mortgage takings could have on society beyond those 
affected at the local level.42 
Part I highlights the effect that home prices and homeownership have 
on the financial integrity of local governments.43 Communities with 
depressed home prices and high foreclosure rates often cannot generate 
sufficient tax revenues for their local government to provide a desirable 
level of public services. In short, the economic problem becomes a civic 
problem that further serves to reduce the incentive for existing and 
                                                                                                                 
=1202572203513&Eminently_reasonable (“A common argument by the investing community is 
that pro-borrower developments will destroy credit markets . . . . This long-term chilling of the 
credit markets has never actually happened. If lenders and investors think they can make money in 
the market, they will return to it like bears to honey.”). 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 112-6397, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr6397ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr6397ih.pdf (“To prohibit Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from 
purchasing, the FHA from insuring, and the Department of Veterans Affairs from guaranteeing, 
making, or insuring, a mortgage that is secured by a residence or residential structure located in a 
county in which the State has used the power of eminent domain to take a residential mortgage.”). 
 42. For a general discussion of the economics involved, see Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra 
note 11, at 137, 156; Robert C. Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting Through the 
Mortgage Mess 3–36 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-11, 
2012) [hereinafter Hockett, Six Years], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029262; Alan C. 
Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Government Posed by the Housing and 
Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 259 (2009) (exploring the various economic consequences 
and challenges that local governments are likely to have to deal with over the next several years 
resulting from a flagging housing market). But see Memorandum from Walter Dellinger et al., 
O’Melveny & Myers LLP to SIFMA 12–16 (July 16, 2012) [hereinafter OMM Memorandum], 
available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/issues/capital_markets/securitization/eminent 
_domain/memorandumfromo'melvenymyerstosifmaresanbernardinoeminentdomainproposal07161
2.pdf (arguing that mortgage takings will cause burdensome litigation that is “time-consuming and 
expensive,” while possibly making it more difficult to get favorable mortgage financing from 
lenders who wish to punish municipalities that exercise their power of eminent domain). 
 43. See Weinstein, supra note 42, at 275–76; Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 
171–75. 
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prospective homeowners to inhabit that locality. With that in mind, 
municipalities considering mortgage condemnations are not doing so to 
remediate a nation-wide housing slump; they are doing what is in their own 
best interest and, at the same time, the best interests of their residents or 
constituencies—the public.44 
Part II outlines the condemnation proceeding that municipalities could 
exercise along with the constitutional and legal basis for that power at both 
federal and state levels. Specifically, I demonstrate that there is ample 
precedent for municipalities to condemn residential mortgages.45 In 
addition, I argue that states should have the constitutional authority to 
condemn mortgages even where the original promissory note is outside the 
state, so long as the real property securing the note is within the state. Part 
II also covers the refinancing of the condemned home mortgages to the 
extent that municipalities can write-down mortgages. But which mortgages 
ought to be condemned or, alternatively, which homeowners should be the 
beneficiaries of the condemnation proceeding is beyond the scope of this 
Note—these are tough decisions which ultimately the citizens and leaders 
of local governments will have to make.46 
Part III explores the benefits of using public finance at the municipal 
level to fund mortgage condemnations, along with the prospective 
advantages that exist for municipalities retaining mortgages for the 
mortgages’ term of years. There is also a brief overview of the legal 
capacity of municipalities to issue tax-exempt municipal bonds. I argue that 
municipalities will be able to get cost-effective financing because of their 
possible tax-exempt status and the fact that they can secure their bonds with 
the existing home mortgages—essentially, municipal bonds that are 
mortgage-backed securities. 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 150 (“It is cities that must watch their 
residents being evicted, their homes being emptied, their houses deteriorating, their property 
values plummeting, their tax bases dwindling, their services retrenching, their crime levels 
spiking, and so on. But they don’t have to lie back and watch. They can act, and act now. They 
exist to address the problems like these. Protecting the citizenry and heading off blight is what 
municipal eminent domain authority is for.”). 
 45. E.g., Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923); City of Cincinnati v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912). 
 46. Professor Hockett has some recommendable suggestions regarding which mortgages 
should be condemned:  
 
First, the Plan will apply only to single family, owner-occupied residences within each 
municipality’s jurisdiction. Second, all existing qualifying lien mortgage loans will have loan 
to value ratios (LTVs) greater than 100%. Third, the aggregate fair market value of loans or 
liens secured by any qualifying home should total 85% or less of the value of the home itself . 
. . . Finally, the value of the qualifying homes will not exceed 105.3% of FHA approved loan 
amounts—thus permitting a 95% new loan to value ratio. 
 
Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 154–55. 
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I. THE MUNICIPALITY AND ITS HOMEOWNERS 
The housing crisis, given the scale of the U.S. housing market as an 
investment for both domestic and international investors, has produced 
consequences on a local, national, and global scale.47 The increasing 
macroeconomic relevance of home prices in the United States is largely due 
to the proliferation of mortgage-backed securities,48 which repackage 
portfolios of home mortgages into more fungible securities.49 Individual 
mortgages have unique qualities and risks that are diversified away or offset 
when aggregated with other mortgages that are facially similar—having 
borrowers and contract terms that are approximate.50 Indeed, the 
securitization of mortgages into mortgage-backed securities gives investors 
from all around the world an opportunity to gain exposure to the U.S. 
housing market; the influx of investors simultaneously gives home buyers 
in the United States greater access to credit (investment capital) that may 
enable them to purchase a house.51 
Regardless of the ubiquity of mortgage-backed securities, the financial 
perils that ensue when housing prices and home values decline are quite 
asymmetrical between investors and homeowners.52 The investors’ 
mortgage-backed securities might be only fractionally composed of 
mortgages that face the prospect of default or a write-down in value. This 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Richard Dorfman et al., MBS Fact Sheet, SIFMA, 3, 
http://www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589934849 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) 
(showing fourteen percent of mortgage-backed securities as “Foreign Holdings”). 
 48. As of 2011, of the approximately $10.5 trillion of residential mortgage debt, about $7.1 
trillion is securitized in some form of a mortgage-backed security, while only $3.4 trillion is “Not 
Securitized.” Id. at 2.  
 49. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007). 
 50. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 
141–44 (1994) (explaining how “credit enhancement” is an indirect benefit of securitization). 
 51. See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1084 (2009) 
(“Securitization can further reduce borrowing costs through financial engineering. Techniques 
such as the division of the [special purpose vehicle’s (SPV)] securities into senior and subordinate 
‘tranches’ expand the potential investor base. They allow the SPV to target new investors with 
tailored payment structures and credit enhancements. In particular, they permit the issuance of 
some securities at a higher credit rating than the overall quality of the assets in the SPV. Such 
senior securities can be sold to institutional investors that may only buy investment-grade paper. 
Adding potential investors boosts overall demand and lowers the cost of financing.”). 
 52. “One study has found that even a single foreclosed home depresses prices of nearby homes 
from just under one to as high as 8.7 percent.” Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 173 
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-12-34, VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING 
NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS AND CHALLENGES 44–45 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586089.pdf). Cf. Weinstein, supra note 42, at 267 (citing Dan 
Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 67, 72 n.1 (2006)) 
(“[T]he value of surrounding properties declines by 0.9% on average for each foreclosed house in 
the vicinity, with the decline even greater in low-income neighborhoods at 1.44%.”). 
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ability to diversify by including mortgages with varied credit risks reduces 
investors’ potential losses from mortgages likely or certain to default.53  
In contrast, given that a residential property is typically a homeowner’s 
largest investment, only residence, and the collateral underlying their 
mortgage, a volatile housing market poses substantial financial risks for 
homeowners.54 Homeowners who can make their mortgage payments and 
who have positive home equity are incentivized to continue making 
payments so long as they think that their home’s value will remain stable or 
rise.55 Whereas those homeowners with negative equity may benefit from 
selling their home or defaulting on their mortgage in order to divert their 
existing mortgage payments to the purchase of an asset (perhaps another 
home) that will accumulate equity.56 Alternatively, depressed home prices 
or comparatively cheap rentals may make the opportunity cost of 
continuing homeownership much higher, thereby altering the transitive 
preferences of homeowners as they seek to reduce their living expenses.57 
In several states the preference default is considerably enhanced because 
lenders have no legal recourse against homeowners for the unpaid mortgage 
debt or deficiency.58 For those homeowners who cannot make their 
payments, default is the consequence and foreclosure is imminent—
whether they have negative or positive home equity, they face the grim 
reality of losing their home.59  
The risk of default or foreclosure is generally going to have a stronger 
correlation with default and foreclosure rates at the local rather than 
national level.60 More importantly, the consequences of default and 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 141–44. 
 54. Foote et al., supra note 12, at 22. 
 55. Id. at 12 (emphasis added) (“Economic theory poses one categorical prediction about the 
relationship between negative equity and default, which is that negative equity is a necessary 
condition for default . . . . This conclusion follows simply from the fact that positive equity implies 
that a borrower can sell the house, pay off the mortgage, and keep the difference, a better outcome 
under any circumstance compared with stopping payment on the mortgage and leaving the 
home.”).  
 56. Id. at 12 (“The idea that one should continue making monthly mortgage payments even 
when the market value of the house is worth less than the outstanding balance on the mortgage 
seems puzzling to many people. Some commentators view the fact that most people with negative 
equity keep their homes as a ‘failure’ of the theory . . . .”). 
 57. See id. at 3. 
 58. Id.; see generally John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Foreclosing A Dream: State Laws Deprive 
Homeowners of Basic Protections, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CENTER (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf 
(nonrecourse or non-deficiency states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Minnesota, 
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington). 
 59. See Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 172 n.156 (citing Janet Currie & Erdal 
Tekin, Is the Foreclosure Crisis Making Us Sick?, NBER Working Paper No. 17310 (August 
2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17310; G.T. Kingsley et al., The Impacts of Foreclosures on 
Families and Communities, URBAN INST. (May 2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF 
/411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf.). 
 60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 19.  
196 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
foreclosure are not diffuse or well-distributed across the broader housing 
market.61 Rather, foreclosures, defaults, and negative equity produce 
externalities that are felt first and foremost at the local level.62 The onset of 
defaults and foreclosures can further depress home values at the local 
level63 as more and more houses go on the market, which are either sold or 
remain in inventory.64 Again, this can drastically alter financial incentives 
for existing homeowners because they are often paying significantly more 
money for their home than it would cost them to buy at the reduced market 
price.65 Reducing their “housing expense” to a level commensurate with the 
market becomes the rational alternative, since homeowners in plighted 
communities can no longer expect to preserve their home equity and may 
potentially lose their wealth as homes prices fall.66 
A. MUNICIPALITIES HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN PRESERVING 
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND HOME EQUITY 
The problem, of course, for municipalities is that much of the revenue 
and budget planning for conducting local government—or municipal 
infrastructure generally—is dependent upon residential property values as a 
function of property taxes.67 Also of great significance is the psychological 
malaise that homeowners and citizens deal with as a result of worrying 
                                                                                                                 
 61.  See generally Pamela Lee, Eminent Domain, The Debate Distracts from Pressing 
Problems, URBAN INST., at 5–6 (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412937-
Eminent-Domain-The-Debate-Distracts-from-Pressing-Problems.pdf (documenting the 
geographic concentration of foreclosure and negative equity). 
 62. “By any measure, the epidemic of home losses is severe, and will not only harm the 
families who lose their homes, but also nearby homeowners who suffer drops in their property 
values and communities who suffer the impact of lower tax revenues.” Subprime Spillover: 
Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $223 Billion; 44.5 Million Homes Lose $5,000 on Average 5, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles 
/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/subprime-spillover111307.pdf. 
 63. Thomas Deutsch of the American Securitization Forum provided his insights to Congress: 
 
The primary factors our members have identified that have combined to put severe strain on 
homeowners and drive rising delinquencies, defaults and foreclosures include: 1) 
unavailability of mortgage credit for refinancing opportunities; 2) declining home values; 3) 
high levels of non-mortgage credit outstanding (e.g., credit card, auto loan, other debt); 4) 
prevalence of 2nd liens; and 5) rising unemployment levels and reductions in income, making 
mortgage payment unaffordable. 
 
Private Sector Cooperation with Mortgage Modifications—Ensuring That Investors, Servicers, 
and Lenders Provide Real Help for Troubled Homeowners: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 110th Cong. 64–65 (2008) (statement of Thomas Deutsch, Deputy Executive Director, 
American Securitization Forum), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg46592/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg46592.pdf. 
 64. Kingsley et al., supra note 59, at 19 (citing numerous effects of local foreclosures). 
 65. See Foote et al., supra note 12, at 3, 12. 
 66. Id. 
 67. “The most obvious repercussion from the housing/credit crisis for local government is its 
affect [sic] on municipal revenues.” Weinstein, supra note 42, at 266. 
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about the value of their homes.68 Homeowners who are not confident in 
their largest investment (their home) are more conservative consumers,69 
which may negatively impact local economies and tax revenues.70 
Municipalities, therefore, have incentives to stave off the continued 
collapse of property values and, at the same time, contain the conflagration 
of ill effects resulting from a fiscal crisis in local government.71 The 
encompassing communities, too, surely want to see home values stabilize, 
along with preserving homeownership and the demographics or social 
fundamentals that homeownership helps to anchor within communities.72 
Though each community73 is in a unique position to assess the equities and 
challenges posed by the housing crisis, “[f]or the problem itself is 
essentially, in its first instance, local in character.”74 
B. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE PROPERLY SUITED TO PLAY THE 
ROLE OF AN INTERMEDIARY FOR CONDEMNING MORTGAGES 
AND FORCING PRINCIPAL REDUCTIONS 
Those who oppose the use of eminent domain to condemn mortgages 
are correct to point out that the promise, and indeed the risk, of exercising 
municipal power in such a situation is relative to the time, expense, and 
overall efficiency of the condemnation proceedings.75 By definition, a 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Foote et al., supra note 12, at 22 (describing instances when homeowners with negative 
equity “remained vulnerable to adverse life events, like job loss, illness, and divorce, all of which 
create cash-flow problems”). 
 69. Weinstein, supra note 42, at 267–68. In a sense, homeowners dealing with negative equity 
have already taken a big risk and lost. They are therefore less able to borrow money and engage in 
commerce or start new business ventures. However small or inconsequential a small entrepreneur 
might seem, small businesses run by such individuals help maintain both the social and economic 
fabric of communities. Foote et al., supra note 12 (discussing the homeowner’s financial “inertia” 
when owning a home with negative equity).  
 70. “First, as homes are the most valuable asset for most families, the reduction in home value 
makes them feel less wealthy and reduces their ability to tap into the home’s equity—factors that 
lead households to cut back on expenditures.” Weinstein, supra note 42, at 266. 
 71. “Across California, the recession that ended in 2009 and the foreclosure crisis have 
depleted property-tax revenue even as municipalities are burdened with rising costs.” Brian 
Chappatta & Kathleen Hays, California Muni Bankruptcies a Growing ‘Disease,’ Kotok Says, 
BLOOMBERG (October 3, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-03 
/california-muni-bankruptcies-a-spreading-disease-kotok-says.html (discussing three coinciding 
municipal bankruptcies in California—Stockton, San Bernardino, and Mammoth Lakes). 
 72. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-family Mortgage Foreclosures 
on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 859–62 (2006); Kingsley et al., supra note 64, 
at 15–21 (listing crime, social disorder, population turnover, and deterioration of governmental 
services as negative effects associated with foreclosures). 
 73. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and 
the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1648 (2006) (“The source of homeowners’ incentive 
to control local politics is their common goal of preserving the value of their property. The 
financial stakes alone are enormous.”). 
 74. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 150. 
 75. See OMM Memorandum, supra note 42, at 12–15; see also Judicial Versus Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter 
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municipality is a devolutionary form of government subject to overriding 
county and state law,76 which means that a municipality’s administrative 
authority, including the power of eminent domain, is likely constrained by 
state and county law.77 As a result, local governments should evaluate the 
legal and economic viability of a mortgage takings plan by first examining 
eminent domain law in their respective jurisdictions.78 Furthermore, since 
local governments are mainly administrative entities, many of the 
bureaucratic functions required for carrying out the condemnation 
proceedings, along with finalizing mortgage principal reductions, are within 
the capacity of a municipal corporation or can be sought at the local or 
county level.79 Basic procedural matters such as serving process or notice, 
attaching the mortgage note and underlying deed of trust, or recording 
changes therein are functions that a municipality can often handle directly 
without having to seek prior approval from a state legislature.80 
Additionally, municipalities that levy property taxes are in an 
advantageous position to decide whether or not to use their eminent domain 
power because they already have annual assessments of property values.81 
The assessments, as well as the factors that are used to determine real estate 
values in a locality, can be used during the condemnation proceeding as 
evidence of the mortgage collateral’s “fair value.”82 Part III of this Note 
covers some of the aspects of property valuation for condemnation 
proceedings.83  
Even before the condemnation proceeding begins, establishing the fair 
value of a particular residential property is essential for ascertaining the 
value of the mortgage instrument and the corresponding likelihood that a 
homeowner will default or have any chance of realizing positive home-
                                                                                                                 
/ForeclosureProcess/JudicialVersusNon-JudicialForeclosure.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) 
(estimating the foreclosure process as taking anywhere from 480 to 700 days). 
 76. E.g., N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 66 (McKinney 2012) (“A ‘municipal corporation’ 
includes a county, city, town, village and school district.”). Similarly, California law puts 
emphasis on a unit of government’s incorporation status. Counties and cities are incorporated, 
while towns are unincorporated, with counties being the largest unit of incorporated political 
government. CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 19–21 (West 2012). 
 77. Again, this varies amongst the states. Some states vest eminent domain powers with 
counties, and the small subunits within the county, such as cities and school districts. E.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE § 8.08.010 (West 2013) (“Every county is hereby authorized and empowered to 
condemn land and property within the county for public use . . . .”). Other states, like New York, 
focus on the delineation of incorporated local government to provide a measure of uniformity 
throughout the state, rather than county-by-county balkanization. E.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. 
LAW § 101 (McKinney 2012) (Eminent Domain’s Purpose). 
 78. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1255.410 (West 2012) (California’s “quick take” provision). 
 79. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 96 (3d ed. 2009). 
 80. See id. §§ 129–30.  
 81.  See id. § 96.  
 82. “Fair market value, however, is a moving target.” Stewart E. Sterk & Mitchell L. Engler, 
Property Tax Reassessment: Who Needs It?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1066 (2006). 
 83. See id. at 1068–70.  
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equity over the life of the mortgage.84 Local governments are well 
positioned to account for the cumulative factors that can be used to 
ascertain property values and to screen homeowners85 who are the most 
eligible for condemnation proceedings.86 That local governments are 
already properly scaled to assess property values adds to both the efficiency 
and efficacy of the mortgage taking’s proposal because the benefits of the 
combined condemnation proceedings and principal reductions are precisely 
relative to both (1) the ability of target homeowners to afford their 
restructured mortgages and (2) the stability of the new loan-to-value ratio 
on the restructured mortgages.87 Local government’s role in property 
assessment is vital for assuring that both of those elements are met. 
Realizing the value of (or revaluing) residential properties is the very thing 
that many financial institutions or investors in mortgage-backed securities 
have been unwilling to accept, as it may implicate a write-down on their 
investment.88 
For those wary of eminent domain being used to condemn mortgage 
notes without paying just compensation, a municipality’s interest in 
securing low property assessments is checked by the amount of property 
taxes that it can levy with that same assessment.89 A municipality is 
deterred from making fraudulently low assessments solely to condemn 
property on the cheap because it would effectively nullify the 
municipality’s ability to raise revenues and engage in budget planning.90 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See generally Tomasz Piskorski et al., Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: 
Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 1–5 (Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 
09-02, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321646 (discussing factors to be considered 
in mortgage renegotiation).  
 85. Recall that the Mortgage Resolution Partners’ proposed role as an intermediary was to 
screen homeowners that were good candidates for mortgage condemnation. See Mortgage 
Resolution Partners, supra note 35, at 9. Given that the local governments have as good an 
estimation of property values as any other organization, it is not beyond comprehension that 
municipalities themselves could also handle some of the aspects of credit screening homeowners 
for the appropriate loan modifications, pursuant to the mortgage condemnation. 
 86. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 154–55. 
 87. See Foote et al., supra note 12, at 1–5. 
 88. Hockett, Six Years, supra note 42, at 10 n.19 (discussing the “extend and pretend” 
mentality of financial institutions). 
 89. Sterk & Engler, supra note 82, at 1066–74 (discussing the difficulties of reassessing 
property values for tax purposes). 
 90. Id. at 1070 (“[T]ax assessment is a political process; the ultimate responsibility for 
assessments rests on the shoulders of elected officials, and they have incentives to minimize any 
damage to their political careers that reassessment might generate.”). It is “fairly easy to forecast 
in advance the amount of revenue that the real-property tax in a particular locality will produce, 
thus facilitating the budget process.” Id. 
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C. JURISDICTION-TO-JURISDICTION, EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS 
VARY WITH RESPECT TO ONE-TO-ONE PROPERTY TRANSFERS 
It is important to point out that Professor Hockett’s plan may run afoul 
of many states’ “anti-Kelo” statutes because it advocates one-to-one 
property transfers.91 Such statutes limit local governments’ ability to 
condemn the property of one private party for the purpose of transferring it 
to another private party.92 Prohibitions on one-to-one property transfers are 
not necessarily specific to either tangible or intangible property and are 
certainly not limited to condemned mortgages.93 However, local 
governments can satisfy anti-Kelo provisions if they can keep the 
mortgages without making a private transfer or conveyance.94 
II. MORTGAGE TAKINGS 
Part II first demonstrates that the use of eminent domain to take 
intangible property such as contracts and mortgages is constitutional and 
given the same legislative deference as the taking or condemnation of real 
property.95 Local governments and municipalities that wish to condemn 
home mortgages have to overcome the same constitutional hurdles to 
legitimately effect a taking but are subject to other limitations by the states. 
Secondly, this Part outlines condemnation proceedings generally and 
                                                                                                                 
 91. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“The State and local governments are prohibited from 
acquiring by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of conveying it to a 
private person.”); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“‘Public use’ does not include the taking of private 
property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or enhancement 
of tax revenues.”); Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1140–42 (Ohio 2006) (agreeing with 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
 92. It has been suggested that Professor Hockett’s proposal would not work in the case of San 
Bernardino County because of a provision in the county charter that prohibits one-to-one property 
transfers by the county where the owner does not consent. OMM Memorandum, supra note 42, at 
11. However, article VI, section 5 of the San Bernardino Charter lists the “Owner” as the 
“owner(s) of the fee title interest in the property to be acquired.” SAN BERNARDINO CNTY. 
CHARTER art. VI, § 5, available at http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir 
/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf. In the case of either a deed of trust or a 
mortgage, the mortgagor-borrower is going to have equitable title. More importantly, the property 
being acquired is not the real estate property itself, as the San Bernardino Charter suggests, but the 
mortgage note, in which there is no “fee title interest” to speak of.  
 93. Kelo emphasized deference to legislatures when determining whether a taking was for a 
“public purpose.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. State legislatures are free to put limitations on the use of 
eminent domain; as mentioned, supra note 91, Michigan’s Constitution has a public use provision 
that applies to private property generally. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2. However, intuition about the 
force of anti-Kelo provisions is probably most relevant to real property takings. 
 94. If the property is not transferred, then Kelo analysis is avoided. Where there is a transfer, 
arguments that the taking advances local economics may not be sufficient. See Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 642 (Okla. 2006) (holding in part that economic development 
was not considered a public use where the condemned property was transferred to a private party). 
 95. “The state or federal legislature may initially determine what constitutes a public use, but 
the courts have the final authority to decide whether this legislative determination is correct.” 
Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, Municipalization, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1505, 1514 (2005). 
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expounds the legal precedent for condemning intangible property, like 
mortgage notes. Part II also surveys the procedural and jurisdictional 
challenges that are specific to condemnation proceedings of intangible 
property, as opposed to real property. 
A. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OUTLINED: PUBLIC PURPOSE, NECESSITY, 
AND COMPENSATION 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause requires that a taking of 
private property have a public purpose;96 that the taking is in fact necessary 
to achieve that purpose;97 and that just compensation98 is made to the 
property owners for the taking.99 For prospective mortgage condemnations 
under Professor Hockett’s proposal, the most pertinent of these 
requirements is the public purpose requirement because mortgages will be 
condemned from one mortgagee to be refinanced by a new (private) 
mortgagee.100 
1. Public Purpose 
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed the legitimacy of one-to-one 
takings in Kelo v. City of New London: 
On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take 
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private 
party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is 
equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to 
another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking . . . .101 
The Court held that the City of New London’s taking of residential 
properties, which the city intended to give to private developers as part of a 
larger economic program,102 was constitutional.103 The Court reasoned that 
promoting economic development was a traditional government power and 
sufficient public purpose given that the city had “carefully formulated” an 
economic plan aimed at creating jobs and increasing tax revenue.104 Just as 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (“The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question 
whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’ Without exception, our cases have 
defined that concept broadly . . . .”). 
 97. By inference, if a taking is for a public purpose, then it was necessary to accomplish that 
public purpose. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (stating that it is not for the courts 
to determine whether a taking is necessary to achieve the legislature’s goal). 
 98. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) (“This Court has 
never attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for determining what is ‘just compensation’ under all 
circumstances and in all cases. Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”). 
 99. See REYNOLDS, supra note 79, at 525.  
 100. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 156. 
 101. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.  
 102. Id. at 483–85.  
 103. Id. at 477.  
 104. Id. at 483–85.  
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important, the Court acknowledged that the use of eminent domain to effect 
a one-to-one transfer of property may benefit private parties and that such 
benefit is often incidental but necessary to achieving the underlying public 
purpose.105 
The Kelo decision—besides its analysis of one-to-one property 
transfers—was a reminder that the Supreme Court’s conception of public 
purpose is expansive enough to allow for novel justifications for the use of 
eminent domain. Two crucial precedents the Kelo Court cited, Berman v. 
Parker106 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,107 were also cases in 
which eminent domain was used to make one-to-one transfers of property 
interests. In Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld the District of Columbia 
Redevelopment Act of 1945,108 which sought to condemn blighted areas for 
redevelopment, with some of the property being sold or leased to private 
parties.109 The Berman Court characterized the District of Columbia’s 
exercise of eminent domain as a legitimate use of its “police power.”110 The 
Court further described it as “fruitless” to “attempt to define” the police 
powers with exactitude, including eminent domain, because such a 
“definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed 
to the purposes of government—purposes neither abstractly nor historically 
capable of definition.”111 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court followed the Berman 
approach, upholding a Hawaii statute that condemned fee title in real 
property from lessors and transferred to lessees “in order to reduce the 
concentration of ownership of fee simple in the State.”112 The statute’s 
purpose was to mitigate the “evils” of Hawaii’s centuries-old land 
oligopoly.113 The Court reiterated that its role is not to determine if the 
taking will actually fulfill the public purpose,114 nor is it for the Court to 
second-guess the legislature and its judgment about what steps should be 
taken to advance such purposes or whether those steps include eminent 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 485 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984)); cf. Haw. 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“A purely private taking could not withstand 
the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government 
and would thus be void.”). 
 106. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 107. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229. 
 108. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-592, 60 Stat. 790 
(codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 6-101.01(a) (2001)). 
 109. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. 
 110. Id. at 32.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. 
 113. Id. at 242.  
 114. Id.  
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domain.115 In sum, like Kelo, Berman and Midkiff exemplify the notion that 
eminent domain is “merely”116 a means to an end.117 
The Supreme Court’s “broad and inclusive”118 conception of public 
purpose bodes well for mortgage condemnation proposals that envision 
private lenders stepping in to assume the condemned mortgages. In fact, 
much of what Professor Hockett has written about mortgage condemnations 
gets at the very core of the public purpose and welfare that is at stake for 
homeowners, mortgagees, and municipalities that consider mortgage 
takings as an option.119 The social consequences of foreclosure, default, and 
large sums of negative equity implicate the traditional purview of a local 
government’s police powers. Condemning mortgages to mitigate such 
circumstances is certainly no more novel an exercise of the eminent domain 
power than the aforementioned Supreme Court precedents. However, many 
state constitutions specifically limit one-to-one property transfers to a much 
greater extent than the Takings Clause.120 Consequently, my proposal of 
publicly financed mortgage condemnations, with the mortgages held 
indefinitely by the municipalities, completely ameliorates the restrictions on 
one-to-one transfers and will likely reduce judicial scrutiny. 
2. Necessity 
The requirement of necessity for property takings is not centrally 
concerned with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as much as it is 
with constitutional or legislative obstacles posed by the states.121 Some 
states do not impose judicial scrutiny for the necessity requirement, while 
others require a taking to be reasonably necessary to carry out the 
designated public purposes.122 Generally, with the exception of egregious 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 244 (“In such cases, government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the 
taking; it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the 
Public Use Clause.”); cf. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“We do not sit to determine whether a particular 
housing project is or is not desirable.”). 
 116. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
 117. This turn of phrase “means to an end” is used later in the discussion of possible dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges. See infra text accompanying note 200. In both instances, the phrase 
represents the idea that eminent domain itself is neither legitimate nor illegitimate, but rather the 
essential inquiry is in regards to the broader goals that condemnation accomplishes. 
 118. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
 119. See Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 11, at 171–75. 
 120. See REYNOLDS, supra note 79, at 547 (“These measures, which have been enacted in one 
form or another in at least 42 states, have limited, or outright prevented, the use of condemnation 
to acquire property for economic development, and many have also re-defined what constitutes 
‘blight’ for purposes of condemning property for urban renewal.”). 
 121. In Berman v. Parker, the necessity language is used in passing when referring to the 
legislatures determinations. Berman, 348 U.S. at 36. The necessity requirement has been 
somewhat collapsed into the public purpose analysis. Id. (“If the Agency considers it necessary in 
carrying out the redevelopment project to take full title to the real property involved, it may do 
so.”). 
 122. REYNOLDS, supra note 79, at 547–48.  
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abuses of eminent domain not consistent with plausible public purposes, 
courts accord great deference to a legislature or municipality’s finding of 
necessity.123 
3. Just Compensation 
The “Armstrong principle”124 animates the just compensation provision 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause, ensuring that the government 
does not make individual citizens bear the cost of a taking.125 But this 
principle does not determine what compensation ought to be paid, or what 
compensation might be called just.126 Rather, the Supreme Court has held 
that just compensation is synonymous with “fair market value.”127 In 
United States v. Miller,128 the Court explained fair market value as “what a 
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.”129 
The Supreme Court’s market-oriented language seems to assume a 
degree of efficiency and liquidity that permits a monetary value to be 
assigned as in an arm’s-length transaction. But the Miller Court recognized 
that condemnations, given the timing of the condemnations or the type of 
property or its location, present untold vagaries when assessing fair market 
value.130 Each situation requires its own fact-intensive inquiry. This is 
certainly true for mortgage condemnations, where the value of the mortgage 
is not based on the underlying home’s value but on the present value of 
future payments—adjusted for the risk that those payments will not be 
made. 131 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at 548 (“An example of such abuse of discretion is the situation in which a local 
government attempts to condemn land because the governing officials want to rid the community 
of the landowner, or because they find his use of the land undesirable.”). 
 124. John D. Echeverria, Public Takings of Private Contracts, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 648 
(2011) (using the phrase “Armstrong principle”). 
 125. “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 125. E.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. V (Takings Clause). 
 127. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 81. 
 128. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). 
 129. Id. at 374.  
 130. “Where, for any reason, property has no market resort must be had to other data to 
ascertain its value; and, even in the ordinary case, assessment of market value involves the use of 
assumptions, which make it unlikely that the appraisal will reflect true value with nicety.” Id.  
 131. 𝑃𝑉   0due = 𝐶 �1− 1(1+𝑖)𝑛𝑖 � (1 + 𝑖), where PV = present value; n = number of periods; C = 
monthly mortgage payment; and i = interest rate. KENT A. HICKMAN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 117 (2d ed. 2001). 
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A good analogy to valuing a single mortgage132 is the manner in which 
a bond market values a single bond issuance—the value of the single 
issuance is relative to the value of all other possible investments.133 The 
liquidity and efficiency of the market, of course, influence what a “willing” 
purchaser would pay, but so do the hard numbers that lay behind the 
mortgage: the term of years, the mortgage’s interest rate, the risk-free rate, 
the yield curve, the mortgagor’s income, the home value, prospects for the 
housing market, and so on.134 As important are the soft characteristics of the 
mortgage, such as the mortgagor’s marital status, job security, health, and 
credit history.135 Consequently, valuing a mortgage is an actuarial feast for 
analysts, mathematicians, and speculators. In a condemnation proceeding, 
the financial engineering is left to the judge or the jury, who can review 
evidence and arguments submitted by the government and the condemnee 
to decide the monetary value.136 
B. THE POWER TO CONDEMN INTANGIBLE PROPERTY AND 
MORTGAGES 
The power of both federal and state governments to condemn intangible 
forms of property under the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause is 
longstanding.137 The abundance of Supreme Court precedent138 supporting 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Individual mortgages are not fungible instruments, unlike mortgage-backed securities or 
bonds. See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 143 (explaining how the structure of mortgage-backed 
securities can permit more variance among parties and debt obligations). 
 133. See generally HICKMAN ET AL., supra note 131, at 137–57 (“Time Value Applications: 
Security Valuation and Expected Returns”). 
 134. Yuliya Demyanyk et al., Determinants and Consequences of Mortgage Default, SSRN, 2–
18 (Jan. 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706844 (demonstrating that a mortgagor’s credit score, 
which accounts for many factors, is a good predictor of default).  
 135. See Jason N. Houle & Danya Keene, Getting Sick and Falling Behind: Health and the Risk 
of Mortgage Default and Home Foreclosure 13 (Apr. 12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://paa2013.princeton.edu/papers/130301 (“The findings of this study show that 
worsening health, as measured by changes in health limitations from 2006-2008 and changes in 
chronic conditions from the age of 40-50 significantly increases the risk of default and home 
foreclosure between 2007-2010.”). 
 136. See CAL. CON. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and 
only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into 
court for, the owner.”). Cf. N.Y. EM. DOM. § 512 (West 2013) (“The court, after hearing the 
testimony and weighing the evidence, shall determine the compensation due the condemnees for 
damages as the result of the acquisition.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1263.320 (West 2013) (“The fair 
market value of property taken for which there is no relevant, comparable market is its value on 
the date of valuation as determined by any method of valuation that is just and equitable.”). 
 137. For a comprehensive overview of contract takings, see Echeverria, supra note 124. 
 138. “All of this has been so long settled as to need only the citation of the many cases.” City of 
Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912) (citing Offield v. N.Y., New 
Haven, & Hartford R.R., 203 U.S. 372 (1906); Long Island Water-Supply Co. v. City of 
Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); New Orleans Gas-light Co. v. La. Light & Heat Producing & 
Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848)); Proprietors of 
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
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the condemnation of intangibles, including franchises,139 contracts,140 
options,141 rights of way,142 and titles in real property,143 demonstrates that 
the ability of local governments to condemn home mortgages is a natural 
and foreseen extension of the power of eminent domain.144 Indeed, the 
Court has explicitly recognized that the power of eminent domain embraces 
all forms of property to the extent that the condemned property (or property 
rights) can be defined: 
[T]he right of every state to authorize the appropriation of every 
description of property for a public use is one of those inherent powers 
which belong to state governments, without which they could not well 
perform their great functions. It is a power not surrendered to the United 
States, and is untouched by any of the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution, provided there be due process of law; that is, a law 
authorizing it, and provision made for compensation. This power extends 
to tangibles and intangibles alike. A chose in action, a charter, or any kind 
of contract, are, along with land and movables, within the sweep of this 
sovereign authority.145 
Even so, eminent domain is often confounded in the context of contract 
takings146 because the Contract Clause prohibits state governments from 
altering contract rights.147 But the Contract Clause “is not a limitation upon 
the power of eminent domain.”148 In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United 
States,149 the Supreme Court divined the modern standard for determining 
when a contract is effectively condemned or “appropriated.”150 In Omnia, 
the federal government “requisitioned” a steel company’s production of 
steel for an entire year, effectively displacing a purchaser who had 
contracted with the steel company to lock in a price for the entirety of 
1918.151 World War I, of course, made steel a very scarce and valuable 
commodity, which meant that the purchaser, having lost the contract to the 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Dix, 47 U.S. 507. 
 140. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (“Valid contracts are property, whether 
the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.”). 
 141. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 384 (1946). 
 142. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390. 
 143. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
 144. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 561 (1870) (“Can the poor man’s cattle, and horses, and 
corn be thus taken by the government when the public exigency requires it, and cannot the rich 
man’s bonds and notes be in like manner taken to reach the same end . . . ? Is it anything more 
than putting the securities of the capitalist on the same platform as the farmer’s stock?”). 
 145. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added). 
 146. See Echeverria, supra note 124, at 654. 
 147. U.S. CONST. art I., § 10, cl. 1.  
 148. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. at 400; see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 n.27 (1977) (“The States remain free to exercise their powers of eminent 
domain to abrogate such contractual rights, upon payment of just compensation.”). 
 149. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923). 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 507.  
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government, was forced to buy steel at higher market rates.152 The Court 
held that the requisition terminated the contract and that there was no taking 
because the government was not filling the shoes of one of the parties to the 
contract.153 The Court distinguished between the “appropriation” and 
“frustration” of contracts, reasoning that the contract at issue was frustrated 
because the government was condemning the steel and not the contract 
rights to the steel—the subject matter of the contract instead of the contract 
itself.154 
The Omnia appropriation/frustration distinction elucidates a 
fundamental difference between the taking of real property and the taking 
of contracts.155 When real property is condemned, the rights of all possible 
parties—in fact the entire world—are affected by the taking.156 Conversely, 
when contracts such as promissory notes (debt) are condemned, only the 
rights of the contracting parties are affected.157 These contract rights 
represent an intangible property interest in the contract that can be 
extinguished when the contract is condemned.158 Practically, the taking of 
real property has a unilateral effect in the sense that the government 
exercises sole ownership over said property exclusive of everyone else.159 
However, a contract taking has bilateral effects since the government 
replaces a contracting party, assuming their rights and duties, while the 
remaining counterparty is still bound to perform under the contract.160  
These conceptual differences have crucial implications for the 
procedural aspects of mortgage condemnations, even though municipalities 
need only proceed in personam against the mortgagee to extinguish the 
mortgagee’s rights in the note. In order to adjudicate those rights, 
municipalities must first establish their authority or jurisdiction over both 
the mortgagee and the mortgage note. 
C. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 
Unlike real property, the original mortgage notes owned by non-
resident mortgagees are often physically outside the territorial jurisdiction 
or geographic boundaries of a state. A state’s power to condemn property 
within its boundaries is well established.161 Outside that territorial 
jurisdiction, courts have been unwilling to allow states to take movable 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 641.  
 153. Omnia Commercial Co., 261 U.S. at 511–13. 
 154. Id. at 511 (“If the steel company had failed to comply with the requisition, what would 
have been the remedy? Not enforcement of the contract, but enforcement of the statute.”).  
 155. See Echeverria, supra note 124, at 667–69. 
 156. Id. at 642. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 642–43.   
 159. Id. at 667–69.   
 160. Id.   
 161. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.02 (3d ed. 2013) (providing extensive case law).  
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personal or intangible property, as it abrogates the sovereignty of other 
states.162 Thus, each state’s geographic borders also represent the scope of 
its subject-matter jurisdiction when exercising eminent domain.163 Within 
each state, local or municipal governments can be authorized to condemn 
property beyond their territorial limits.164 But extraterritorial takings must 
fulfill a local purpose, or be necessary to effect that purpose, for the 
condemning governmental authority.165  
Knowing the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction, it is still necessary to 
determine where the movable or intangible property is located, since unlike 
real property it can exist as a legally cognizable interest under multiple 
states’ jurisdictions or can be physically moved from one jurisdiction to 
another.166 Both federal and state laws traditionally have assigned a location 
or situs to the various forms of movable property in the varied contexts of 
property taxation, escheatment, and distribution of property in divorce 
proceedings.167 For taxation and divorce, situs can exist in multiple 
jurisdictions simultaneously, but in the eminent domain context there is 
thought to be only one legal situs for each type of property.168 This prevents 
multiple states from condemning such property and protects property 
owners from multiple condemnation actions against the same property.169 
But it requires using a situs rule, like in escheatment, that permits only one 
location, which consequently allows only one state to exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction over the property.170 For example, the doctrine of 
mobilia sequuntur personam is one method for determining situs that 
follows “the general principle that rights of ownership and transfer of 
movable property are determined by the law of the owner’s domicile.”171 In 
short, the owner’s last known domicile determines which state has subject-
matter jurisdiction over the owner’s movable property.172  
Although it is somewhat antique, limiting situs to a single location is a 
fairly intuitive approach for most types of movable property and in most 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See, e.g., Mayor of Balt. v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 284–85 (D. Md. 
1985) (citing NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 161, § 2.1). 
 163. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 161, § 2.07. 
 164. Marjorie A. Shields, Validity of Extraterritorial Condemnation by Municipality, 44 A.L.R. 
6th 259 (2009). 
 165. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 844 (Cal. 1982) (“[E]xtraterritorial 
condemnation has been acknowledged when necessary to implement local condemnation.”). 
 166. See Ellen Mufson, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain: 
Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 395–99 (1985) (discussing the situs of 
intangibles for tax purposes and arguing that intangibles should have the same situs as they would 
under the law of escheat).  
 167. Id. at 395–405; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942). 
 168. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 161, § 2.07. 
 169. See Mayor of Balt. v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 287 (D. Md. 1985) 
(endorsing mobilia sequuntur personam in the context of condemning a sports franchise).  
 170. See Mufson, supra note 166, at 403–07.  
 171. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1094 (9th ed. 2009). 
 172. See Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. at 287. 
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cases wouldn’t seem to offend either states’ interests or property owners.173 
But it rests upon the legal fiction174 that all condemned property interests 
are in only one place at any given time.175 Again, for most forms of 
property this fiction is quite workable, but I argue that for modern 
mortgages it is unwieldy.176 One need only consider the numerous and 
rarified property rights to which a mortgage note appertains, including the 
right to be paid, the right to a security interest, and the right to foreclose on 
real property.177 These rights are formed under the state law where the 
homeowner and real property are located; and, perhaps more importantly, 
the enforcement of such rights, especially foreclosure, is naturally 
accomplished in the jurisdiction (forum) where the homeowner and real 
property are located.178  
The equities of adopting a bright-line situs rule for mortgage notes 
sufficiently ameliorate concerns that the exercise of eminent domain would 
violate states’ rights and the due process rights of a non-resident mortgagee. 
First, the bright-line rule would provide the certainty to both states and 
mortgagees that, for the purposes of condemnation, the property rights in 
the mortgage note are not severable from the location of the real property. 
As distinguished from the other situs rules, like mobilia sequuntur 
personam, this proposed rule extinguishes any further inquiries into where 
the mortgagee is and their current domicile. Eminent domain purists can 
continue to proclaim that property can only be condemned in one state’s 
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other states. Inversely, if the situs were 
determined by mobilia sequuntur personam, then the non-resident 
mortgagee’s state of domicile would be able to exercise subject-matter 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See Mufson, supra note 166, at 395–405.  
 174. “An assumption that something is true even though it may be untrue, made esp. in judicial 
reasoning to alter how a legal rule operates . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 171, at 
976 (definition of “legal fiction”). 
 175. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 429 (1939) (“In view of the enormous extent to which 
intangibles now constitute wealth, and the increasing mobility of men, particularly men of 
substance, the necessity of a single headquarters for all legal purposes, particularly for purposes of 
taxation, tends to be a less and less useful fiction.”). 
 176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 (1971) (“The interests of the 
parties in a thing are determined, depending upon the circumstances, either by the ‘law’ or by the 
‘local law’ of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant 
relationship to the thing and the parties . . . .”); see also Mufson, supra note 166, at 394 
(acknowledging that the Supreme Court has never reached the issue of whether it was permissible 
for states to condemn intangibles that are associated with several jurisdictions).  
 177. See Form No. 3200, Single Family Multistate Fixed Rate Note, FANNIE MAE, at 2, 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/3200w.doc (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (“In 
addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust, 
or Security Deed (the ‘Security Instrument’), dated the same date as this Note, protects the Note 
Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep the promises which I make in this 
Note.”).  
 178. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 135–44 (5th 
ed. 2007) (outlining mortgage theories and the rights mortgagees are entitled to under each 
theory). 
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jurisdiction to condemn the mortgage (and for what unearthly purpose?), to 
the exclusion of the state where the homeowner and real property are 
physically located. In sum, a rule like mobilia sequuntur personam does not 
account for the legal rights that mortgage transactions embody.179 
Second, the mortgagee’s due process rights would not be obviated by 
my proposed bright-line situs rule because, already, the mortgagee’s 
substantive rights meaningfully exist only in the state where the real 
property is located. Practically, this means that in order to collect on the 
debt or foreclose on the home to satisfy that debt, the mortgagee must rely 
on the courts and procedure within the same jurisdiction as the real 
property. These rights and interests, as will be demonstrated below, also 
allow those same courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
mortgagee. Moreover, without considering the convenience of each 
jurisdictional venue, it is unclear how giving those courts subject-matter 
jurisdiction to condemn a mortgage note from a non-resident mortgagee 
would be either unconstitutional or unfair. In such a scenario, the mortgage 
note is condemned and the mortgagee can contest the taking. If the 
condemnation is affirmed, then the mortgagee will receive compensation.  
Regardless of the mortgage note’s situs, mortgagees already face the 
prospect that they will lose their security interest in the event that the 
mortgaged real property is condemned.180 Condemning the mortgage note 
would present no additional hardships for the mortgagee. 
D. DUE PROCESS & PERSONAL JURISDICTION  
In addition to having subject-matter jurisdiction and complying with 
substantive due process when condemning notes, municipalities must 
accord mortgagees adequate procedural due process as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.181 A court or tribunal 
condemning the promissory note will be proceeding in personam against 
the mortgagee to take and extinguish their ownership interest in the note 
and mortgage.182 The preliminary issue then is whether state courts can 
                                                                                                                 
 179. ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND J. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 
147 (2d ed. 1981) (“The mortgage was drafted as an instrument given to secure a separate 
document that evidenced the mortgage debt. This separate document ultimately took the form a 
negotiable note. If default and foreclosure occurred, the sale reduced part, but not all, of the 
mortgage debt.”).  
 180. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 161, § 5.03 (“When mortgaged property is 
taken by eminent domain, the mortgagee’s rights against the land follow the award in equity, and 
he or she may, in suitable proceedings, have the mortgage debt satisfied out of that fund in 
advance of other creditors of the mortgagor or of an assignee of the award.”). 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 182. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (“If a court's jurisdiction is based on its 
authority over the defendant's person, the action and judgment are denominated ‘in personam’ and 
can impose a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is based 
on the court's power over property within its territory, the action is called ‘in rem’ or ‘quasi in 
rem.’”). 
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assert personal jurisdiction over a mortgagee or other party holding the 
promissory note, who is presumably a real person, a corporation, or a 
securitization trust; again, particularly when that party is outside the state’s 
territory. Though states may choose to permit their respective courts to 
assert personal jurisdiction over litigants to the extent that the Constitution 
allows, states can also curtail that jurisdiction with a “long-arm” statute.183 
Such long-arm statutes vary by state, but are probably not an obstacle to 
condemnation proposal. Instead, greater challenges are posed by explicit 
state level limitations on eminent domain as discussed above.  
In order to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, due process 
requires that a defendant—here the mortgagee—have sufficient or 
“minimum” contacts with the state that is exercising jurisdiction.184 
Determining whether there are minimum contacts requires an analysis of 
the “quality and nature of the activity” that a defendant has in or with the 
state.185 In the context of condemning a mortgage note, the fact that a note 
is by definition a contract secured or collateralized by the underlying real 
property—the house within the municipality’s jurisdiction—gives local 
courts a plausible means to assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
mortgagee, whose only connection with the forum is ownership of the 
mortgage’s promissory note.186 The in personam nature of asserting 
personal jurisdiction over the mortgagee’s promissory note and the in rem 
nature of the real property, as the security interest embodied in the 
mortgage, seems to be an adequate combination of contacts and interests, 
which the Supreme Court said in Shaffer v. Heitner187 could sustain quasi in 
rem (personal) jurisdiction.188 The Shaffer Court foresaw a situation where 
                                                                                                                 
 183. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (West 2013) (“A court of this state may exercise 
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2013). 
 184. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation & Placement, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (“[D]ue Process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”)). 
 185. Id. at 319. 
 186. “The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. 
An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a 
nullity.” Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872); cf. Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 
11, at 165 (citing Carpenter and arguing that mortgage debt has situs in the state where the debtor 
is domiciled). 
 187. “[The Court’s decision] should not be read to invalidate quasi in rem jurisdiction where 
real estate is involved.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J. concurring); but see id. at 220 
(Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that quasi in rem jurisdiction was 
no longer “constitutionally viable”). 
 188. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 32 (1942) (“Where a thing is subject to the 
power of a State, a proceeding may be brought to affect the interests in the thing not merely of 
particular persons but of all persons in the world. Such a proceeding is called a proceeding in rem, 
as distinguished from a proceeding brought to affect the interests in the thing of particular persons 
only, which is called a proceeding quasi in rem.”). 
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personal jurisdiction could not be sustained purely in personam, though a 
party’s rights to property within the forum would permit a court to 
legitimately assert jurisdiction: 
[P]resence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction 
by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the 
litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the source of 
the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it 
would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have 
jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s claim to property located in the 
State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s 
protection of his interest.189 
So similar to the Court’s hypothetical is a local government’s 
condemnation of a mortgage or the mortgagee’s promissory note where the 
mortgagee is a non-resident or otherwise unsusceptible to personal 
jurisdiction because the secured interest (in real property) is a significant 
contact with the forum.190 Crucially, the Court discouraged dependence on 
the traditional forms of personal jurisdiction that attempt to rigidly classify 
contacts as between persons (or property) and a state. 
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of “fair play and 
substantial justice” as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is 
simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that “[t]he 
phrase, ‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing’, is a customary elliptical way of 
referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” This 
recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of 
jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify 
exercising “jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.”191 
If this were not enough,192 there is precedent supporting personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant on the sole basis that the resident 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Shaffer, 33 U.S. at 207–08. 
 190. The Shaffer Court also suggests a separate policy argument: “The State’s strong interests 
in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for 
peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support 
jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the 
State.” Id. at 208.  
 191. Shaffer, 33 U.S. at 207. 
 192. THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 433 (2d ed. 2008) (citing FleetBoston 
Fin. Corp. v. fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131–35 (D. Mass. 2001) and Cable 
News Network L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001)) (“Language in 
Shaffer suggests that minimum contacts analysis applies to both in rem and quasi in rem cases, 
and the whole approach of Shaffer seems to emphasize contacts rather than formal rules. But true 
in rem suits—those that are about ownership of the property, including ownership of a 
trademarked domain name—are quite different from Shaffer: A court determining ownership of 
property within its jurisdiction can argue that it must have jurisdiction over anyone with claims on 
the property. Courts are split on this question.”) 
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plaintiff was indebted to the defendant.193 Also, in McGee v. International 
Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that a California court asserting 
personal jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company was valid, where the 
insurer never maintained an office or agent in California, nor had it ever 
solicited or done business in California to obtain the disputed insurance 
policy.194 The Court reasoned, “It is sufficient for purposes of due process 
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with 
that State.”195 For condemnation purposes, this suggests that a mortgagee or 
an assignee who owns the mortgage’s promissory note ought to have some 
inclination that her rights are likely subject to the jurisdiction of the state or 
forum where the mortgaged residential property is located.196 The 
municipality’s (or forum’s) interest in the real property and in having the 
power to adjudicate the rights of the resident-mortgagor validates the 
exercise of jurisdiction.197 
E. POSSIBLE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES ARE 
VAGUE AND CONTINGENT UPON THE ACTIONS OF EACH 
INDIVIDUAL STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
As is evident from the jurisdictional analysis, mortgage condemnation 
has the possibility of including mortgagees who are non-residents of a 
forum. Any extraterritorial effects from condemning mortgages bring 
concerns that local governments could directly or indirectly impact 
interstate commerce and thus violate the dormant Commerce Clause.198 
Without existing factual examples, a likely argument is that “eminent 
domain will be viewed as ‘merely the means to the end’ and courts would 
focus on whether the end, protecting the state interest . . . , violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause.”199 Of course, under the proposed mortgage 
condemnation plans, nothing, and especially not interstate commerce, is 
being regulated.200 However, it is important to clarify that any power, no 
                                                                                                                 
 193. “Indebtedness due from a resident to a non-resident of which bank deposits are an example 
is property within a State.” Penning v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917) (citing Chi., 
R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899)); see also Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 
11, at 165 n.128 (citing Sturm). 
 194. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–22 (1957). 
 195. Id. at 223. 
 196. Cf. id.;Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 197. “The State’s strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its border and 
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 198. OMM Memorandum, supra note 42, at 9–12. 
 199. Saxer, supra note 95, at 1523 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
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(1982) (citing Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925)); but see Piedmont Triad 
Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d 331, 344 (N.C. 2001) (“The dormant, or negative, Commerce 
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less than eminent domain, can be ill-used as a pretext for otherwise 
unconstitutional ends.201 
The Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
cautions local governments that their undertakings, if they cause 
extraterritorial effects or regulatory consequences for interstate commerce, 
must possess a legitimate local purpose and have an impact that is not 
disproportionately burdensome to interstate commerce.202 Where both the 
underlying real property and homeowner-mortgagor are physically within 
the same municipality, there is no a priori basis to sustain a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge.203 Moreover, municipalities have broad 
discretion when selecting which mortgages to condemn and can therefore 
avoid conflict; at least facially, there isn’t a systematic preference for in-
state mortgagees versus out-of-state mortgagees.204 But here, precedent 
provides minimal guidance. 
F. THE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING 
In most jurisdictions, the first step on the path to condemnation is filing 
a petition, after which notice is given to the property owners.205 
Condemning residential real estate typically has few obstacles regarding 
notice.206 However, with intangible properties like a mortgage, notifying the 
owner is less practical;207 with real estate, one knows at the very least where 
the property is located.208 Certainly, providing notice in mortgage 
condemnation proceedings requires notifying the homeowner (mortgagor), 
                                                                                                                 
Clause is awakened only when Congress has not acted ‘to regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.’”). 
 201. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell, J. concurring) (“Without the possession of 
this power the operations of Government would often be obstructed, and society itself would be 
endangered. It is not sufficient to urge, that the power may be abused, for, such is the nature of all 
power, such is the tendency of every human institution . . . . We must be content to limit power 
where we can, and where we cannot, consistently with its use, we must be content to repose a 
salutary confidence. It is our consolation that there never existed a Government, in ancient or 
modern times, more free from danger in this respect, than the Governments of America.”). 
 202. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (outlining the balance of local and 
interstate interests). 
 203. See Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 276–85 (2008). 
 204. See Urbine, 554 S.E.2d at 344 (“We find no case law that supports the proposition that the 
Commerce Clause is a sustainable defense to the condemnation of real property.”). 
 205. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1116 (5th ed. 2002). 
 206. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1240.030 (West 2012) (requirements of eminent domain); id.  
§ 1245.235 (notice requirement for eminent domain); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 501 
(McKinney 2012) (vesting exclusive jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings with the court 
of claims); id. § 202 (notice requirements for real property). 
 207. “In all acquisitions in which the court of claims has jurisdiction . . . , the condemnor . . . 
shall serve either by personal service or by certified mail, upon each condemnee a notice of 
acquisition . . . .” N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 502 (McKinney 2012) (service of notice of 
acquisition); cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1245.235 (West 2012) (requiring first-class mail). 
 208. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (a good example of real property being the 
object of notice rather than the defendant). 
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lender (mortgagee), and, if need be, any third party that carries the deed of 
trust on the mortgage. This could be the original lender or some other 
institution like a title company or escrow service.209 Barring the unforeseen, 
finding the homeowner is elementary—he or she lives in the house. 
However, with the advent and proliferation of mortgage-backed securities, 
effecting notice may require an inquiry as to where the mortgagee is and 
who they are, since the original mortgage lender of record has sold the 
mortgage to a securitization trust or some other investor.210 
It was once common for deeds to be recorded with the actual or original 
mortgagee as the mortgagee of record, with any future assignment of the 
mortgage being recorded afterward.211 As the secondary market for 
mortgages has grown in recent years, it is more common for mortgage 
lenders to record a nominee, like Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (MERS),212 as the mortgagee of record so that assignees of 
the mortgage—often securitization trusts—are able to identify which 
mortgage they actually own.213 Besides acting as a nominee for the original 
lender and for subsequent purchasers of the mortgage note, MERS has 
developed its own private recording system that has effectively displaced 
the function of public land recording offices.214 Participants in both the 
primary and secondary mortgage markets have become accustomed to 
MERS, so much so that it is the de facto recording and information system 
                                                                                                                 
 209. See MBA Fact Sheet: The Role of Electronic Mortgage Registrations MORTGAGE 
BANKERS ASS’N, 1–2 (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter 
/ForeclosureProcess/FactsontheroleofElectronicMortgageRegistration.pdf [hereinafter MBA Fact 
Sheet].  
 210. Statutes requiring that the condemnee (here the mortgagee) be notified by certified mail is 
likely enough to rule out due process challenges. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
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R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(b) (providing that summons can be made on an agent authorized by law). 
 211. See MBA Fact Sheet, supra note 209, at 1–2. 
 212. See id. at 2–3. For an excellent example of the legal ambiguities that surround Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems’ (MERS’) role in the mortgage market, see Bain v. Metro. 
Mortgage Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 36–41 (Wash. 2012) (Where MERS was listed as the 
“beneficiary” of the deeds of trust, the court held that MERS was in fact not the lawful beneficiary 
because it was not the holder of the promissory note on the mortgage.). 
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Corporation holds publicly traded stocks in “street name” to clear and settle trades. See Sample 
Offering Document Language Describing DTC and Book-Entry-Only-Issuance, DEPOSITORY TR. 
COMPANY, at 3 (Dec. 2007), http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/legal/rules_proc/eligibility 
/Sample%20Language.pdf. 
 214. FAQ, MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., http://www.mersinc.org/information-for-homeowners 
/faq-information-for-homeowners#whatismers (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); see also MBA Fact 
Sheet, supra note 209, at 2–3 (“Allowing [MERS] to serve as the mortgagee of record has relieved 
the pressures on the public land records caused by repeated transfers of mortgage rights (such as 
servicing and ownership rights), and thereby helps protect the accuracy and integrity of the chain 
of title.”). 
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for mortgages.215 A large portion of mortgage assignments that were once 
recorded in public record offices (for a fee) are now handled by MERS, the 
perpetual nominee.216 The practical consequence of the shift away from 
public recording is that it’s no longer obvious (or publicly known) who the 
actual mortgagee is—the real party in interest.217 
Mortgage investors and securitization trusts that hold the mortgage 
notes can simply use MERS’s eighteen-digit “mortgage identification 
number” to get the record information of the homeowner, as well as the 
trustee or custodian holding the deed underlying the mortgage.218 Likewise, 
when a homeowner defaults, a lender or servicer can notify the mortgage 
investor so that the investor can exercise its rights in the mortgage—
foreclosure, forbearance, loan modification, etc.219 Fortunately, this private 
recording system can also be accessed by homeowners and government 
entities that are trying to find out who owns a particular mortgage.220 
After finding the parties with an interest in the mortgage note—the 
homeowner, mortgage investor, and mortgage servicer—providing notice is 
typically not much more than sending them a notice of acquisition.221 In 
many jurisdictions this can be done by mail, either first-class or certified.222 
Notified parties have an opportunity to protest the condemnation, 
sometimes first at a formal public hearing, then at trial.223 
The procedural variations of condemnation trials are as numerous as the 
different jurisdictions. A summary of the trial is as follows: 
[A] trial is held, at which the government must establish its authority to 
condemn (which means, in some jurisdictions, that the government must 
show that a taking is “necessary”). The court can give the government 
permission to enter and inspect the subject property; it may require the 
government to make a deposit as security for the eventual condemnation, 
in an amount based on the compensation estimated to be awarded at the 
end of the proceedings. Jurisdictions differ on the availability of a jury 
trial in condemnation actions (none is required under the United State 
Constitution). If there is a jury trial, it is typically the jury that determines 
just compensation; issues of public use and necessity are decided by the 
court. At the conclusion of a successful condemnation action (or within a 
prescribed time thereafter), the government must pay the compensation 
                                                                                                                 
 215.  See MBA Fact Sheet, supra note 209, at 2–3. 
 216. See id.  
 217. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 178, at 465–66. 
 218. FAQ, supra note 214.  
 219. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 178, at 465–66. 
 220. MBA Fact Sheet, supra note 211, at 2–3. 
 221. E.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 502 (McKinney 2012). 
 222. E.g., id.; CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1245.235(b) (West 2012). 
 223. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1245.235(a). 
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awarded, plus interest, if any, accrued from the time of the taking . . . . 
Dissatisfied condemnees may, of course, appeal.224 
The trial often requires the condemning authority to provide extensive 
documentation that helps to determine and define the property being 
condemned.225 Here, a copy of the promissory note or mortgage documents 
is necessary, the taking of which may not be so much physical as legal.226 
The judgment would extinguish the mortgagee’s rights in the mortgage.227 
The corollary here is that if the taking is deemed legitimate, the condemnee 
will spend much of her effort at trial arguing the fair market value of the 
property.228 In fact, both the government and the condemnee are mainly 
looking to the trial as a means to establish the requisite, or just, 
compensation—the condemnee desires as much compensation as possible, 
and the government seeks to pay what it can afford or a lesser amount. 
Again, valuing a mortgage is actuarial in nature and fact-intensive.229 Both 
local governments and sophisticated mortgage investors are well-suited to 
argue the value of mortgage notes, each having access to information that 
indicates the relevant value of the mortgages.230 The condemnee can appeal 
a condemnation judgment, though an appeal is almost certainly going to be 
a replay of the just compensation inquiry.231 
III. FINANCING MORTGAGE TAKINGS WITH MORTGAGE-
BACKED MUNICIPAL BONDS 
Municipalities are well advised to exhaust all of their options in 
pursuing a mortgage condemnation plan,232 and Professor Hockett is right 
to point out that private lenders are a viable source of refinancing for 
condemned mortgages intended to be modified.233 The cost of private 
refinancing is totally dependent on the homeowner’s financial 
circumstances and the value of residential property at the time of 
refinancing.234 Both the value of the residential property and a 
                                                                                                                 
 224. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 205, at 1116. 
 225. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1250.310 (listing what must be in the condemnation complaint); N.Y. 
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homeowner’s finances are subject to fluctuation, especially considering that 
the residential property is likely a distressed asset, and homeowners’ 
finances can dramatically change if they are no longer overburdened by 
their existing mortgage.235 The implication is that private lenders are given 
the extremely difficult task of deciding rational lending terms for 
homeowners who could not afford their previous mortgages. 
Private lending, therefore, is certainly an option, but it cannot be 
evaluated in a vacuum. The benefits and risks require a fact-intensive 
inquiry relevant to each situation, specific to each individual locality, 
residential property, and homeowner. Relatedly, my proposal to publicly 
finance mortgage condemnations through municipal bonds cannot be said 
to be inherently more economical than private lending. However, it does 
offer local governments a degree of certainty if they are concerned that 
private lenders will not be prepared to refinance the condemned mortgages 
on a scale that materially preserves homeownership in their community. It 
also assures that homeowners and citizens cannot be forced from their 
homes on the whim of a bank or servicer, since the mortgages, promissory 
notes, and deeds of trust would be all effectively under the ownership of the 
municipality. 
The basic concept of publicly financed mortgage condemnations is to 
issue municipal bonds that will be used either to fund mortgage 
condemnations or to offset funds already used to condemn mortgages. The 
bonds that finance condemnations would be in a form very similar to 
revenue bonds in that refinanced mortgages would be used to pay down the 
bonds with their payment streams, while the residential property (or deeds) 
would collateralize the bond issuance.236 Functionally, this is quite similar 
to a mortgage-backed security. But unlike the private, mortgage-backed 
security, some municipal bond issuances allow for federal tax subsidy—or, 
more accurately, federal tax exemption.237 
Federal tax exemptions for municipal bonds are governed by the 
Internal Revenue Code (the IRC).238 In order for municipal bonds to 
maintain federal tax exemptions, it is generally required that proceeds from 
bond issuances are neither used to fund private business nor made as loans 
to private entities.239 This policy of non-exemption for “private activity” 
bonds240 is designed to ensure that government entities do not subsidize 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Foote et al., supra note 12, at 12. 
 236. JOEL A. MINTZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL FINANCE 3–6 (2010). 
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2013] Mortgage Takings and Municipal Finance 219 
their projects with tax proceeds the federal government would otherwise 
collect.241 Still, there are certain exceptions or qualifications to the private 
activity policy, allowing for so-called “qualified” bonds,242 which use bond 
proceeds to fund private activities that the IRC specifically subsidizes 
through federal tax exemption.243 The IRC even recognizes a municipal 
bond used to fund mortgage lending called a qualified mortgage bond.244 
Unfortunately, these qualified mortgage bonds cannot be used to finance 
mortgage condemnations in the manner I propose because of two caveats 
stipulating that the bonds (1) cannot be used to replace existing 
mortgages245 and (2) the mortgagor-homeowner cannot recently have had a 
present ownership interest in the financed property.246 Qualified mortgage 
bonds are an ingenious carve-out in the tax code but are mainly designed 
for first-time homebuyers.247 Meeting the stipulations and requirements for 
a valid issuance of qualified mortgagor bonds is probably too onerous for 
the purposes of mortgage condemnations, though the IRC does admit some 
exceptions.248 
A more appropriate bond for financing mortgage condemnations 
appears to be the qualified redevelopment bond.249 Qualified redevelopment 
bonds allow for tax-exempt municipal bond issuances where there is an 
adequate “redevelopment purpose”250 for designated areas of blight.251 The 
two general requirements to achieve tax-exempt status under the qualified 
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redevelopment bond provision are (1) state authorization of such bond 
issuances252 and (2) the formulation of a redevelopment plan that outlines 
how the blighted area will be remediated.253 Municipalities that intend to 
use qualified redevelopment bonds can first assess the level of economic 
distress or blight within their community, after which they can 
conjunctively structure their redevelopment plans and mortgage 
condemnation proposal to legitimize a bond issuance.254 
The practical limitation for qualified redevelopment bonds is that they 
are capped at the state level to ensure that municipalities are not overusing 
the bonds as a loophole to excessive redevelopment—or development 
veiled as redevelopment.255 Whatever the limitations, municipalities should 
consult the IRC to see if their community could benefit from qualified 
bonds because the tax exemptions for such bonds ostensibly provide the 
cheapest cost of capital for refinancing condemned mortgages. 
If municipalities cannot achieve tax-exempt status specifically for 
mortgage condemnation, they might nevertheless benefit from holding a 
portfolio of mortgages. Municipalities that have enough capital reserves to 
condemn and refinance mortgages might be able to attract lower interest 
rates on their general obligation bonds (that are tax-exempt). Local 
governments that demonstrate they are committed to reversing the housing 
decline in their respective communities may persuade investors that their 
local economies are stabilizing. Preserving homeownership, after all, is 
likely to improve property tax revenues and the overall fiscal health of a 
locality, making it a more attractive credit risk and a better place to reside.  
Municipalities that engage in mortgage condemnation as part of a larger 
economic plan would be able to sell publicly refinanced mortgages at a later 
date—allowing municipalities to avoid the threat of insolvency or 
illiquidity as a result of holding too many mortgages. Even if none of these 
opportunities present themselves, municipalities could still use taxable 
municipal bonds to procure capital for mortgage condemnations. 
CONCLUSION 
The fate of mortgage condemnation proposals is uncertain. Such 
proposals have never been implemented, and there is no case law specific to 
the aforementioned legal issues in the context of mortgage takings. 
Moreover, tremendous public and private pressure may ultimately render 
mortgage condemnations as unpopular schemes of local governments or, 
more likely, financially and politically impractical. That I or anyone else 
finds plausible the condemnation proposals considered by Richmond, 
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California, does not vitiate the very real obstacles posed outside the world 
of legal theory. Beyond the bounds of a mere academic or political exercise, 
the worst can and does happen, even when the law appears uniform and 
unambiguous. Accordingly, it is recommendable to be vigilant of legal 
contingencies that arise in the context of mortgage takings. For these 
reasons, the successful implementation of mortgage condemnation 
proposals would require—even more than plausible legal arguments—
extremely adroit statecraft on the part of municipalities. And with 
conditions so variable at the local level, defining “success” is a judgment 
call to be made by citizens, who are unlikely to provide a consensus. 
Finally, it is a fair admonition that mortgage condemnations are not ideal. 
But I implore the reader to bear in mind that those unfortunate enough to be 
involved in circumstances fraught with financial and likely other personal 
or social conflicts might not be looking for an ideal solution.  
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